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OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
In 2004 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
ordered the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) to release Louis
Mickens-Thomas (now Louis Clinton Thomas),1 convicted in 1964 of first-degree
murder, on parole.  After the District Court’s order issued, the Board paroled Thomas on
condition that, among other things, he successfully complete a therapy program at
Forensic Treatment Services (“FTS”).  In July 2005 FTS discharged Thomas from its
program before he had completed his therapy, and the Board subsequently arrested him
3for violating that condition of parole.  
Thomas then filed a Motion to Enforce Habeas Corpus Judgment in the District
Court, arguing that this recommitment violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process
Clauses of our Constitution, as well as the District Court’s prior order that he be released
on parole.  In June 2006 the District Court denied Thomas’s constitutional claims on the
merits and denied the motion, and Thomas appeals these denials to our Court. 
Meanwhile, Thomas has challenged his recommitment in the Pennsylvania state courts. 
In July 2007, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that his recommitment was
supported by substantial evidence of a parole violation, Louis Clinton Thomas v. Pa. Bd.
of Probation & Parole, No. 2061 C.D. 2006 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 26, 2007)
(memorandum opinion), and Thomas’s appeal of that decision is currently pending before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  This pending state litigation affords Thomas the
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.  Id. at 4 n.2 (noting that the Court has the
power to determine “whether any constitutional rights of the parolee have been
violated”). 
Parole is by definition a “conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of
special parole restrictions,”  Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365
(1998), and nothing in the prior parole order required that Thomas remain paroled if he
failed to satisfy the parole condition that he successfully complete the FTS program. 
Thus, Thomas’s only colorable claims are that the Board’s revocation of his parole
violated his constitutional rights.  These constitutional claims have not been exhausted as
4required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
In this context, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Thomas’s motion and
conclude that his constitutional claims, which are distinct from a consideration of whether
the Board violated the prior District Court order and are also unexhausted, should be
dismissed without prejudice.  See Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 207 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007).
                                                         
